Love & Philosophy: Three REsponses to James K. A. Smith

Three writers respond to James K. A. Smith’s essay “I’m a philosopher. We can’t think our way out of this mess.” for The Christian Century‘s series How My Mind Has Changed.

with an introduction by John Wilson

One of the longest-running occasional series in American magazine history is the Christian Century’s “How My Mind Has Changed,” still going strong in 2021. Earlier this year, the Century published a new installment, by James K. A. Smith, professor of philosophy at Calvin University, author of a long shelf of books, and editor in chief of Image journal. I’m interested in this series no matter whose mind is being revealed, but I was particularly interested in this essay as a longtime reader and admirer of Jamie Smith. We’ve known each other for many years, and—though the actual number of hours we’ve spent in each other’s company is not large—I think of him as a friend; I believe he would say the same of me. At the same time, I was vexed when I read the heading—“I’m a philosopher. We can’t think our way out of this mess”—coupled with a subhead that increased my dismay: “I’m throwing my lot in with the poets and the painters, the novelists and songwriters.”

I read through the essay with some agitation, even as I recognized the deeply personal character of its argument. Another friend, Davey Henreckson, expressed heartfelt thanks and appreciation for the essay. I told him that I hoped, once we return to some sort of normality, that he and I could get together so he could tell me what he found compelling. We have yet to get together, but thankfully the editors at Fare Forward commissioned Davey and two other interested parties, M. M. Townsend and Justin Ariel Bailey, to respond to Smith’s essay. I’m very grateful to the three of them for their takes on the subject, to Fare Forward for hosting the conversation, and to Jamie for provoking it. Let a thousand flowers bloom. – John Wilson

Consoling the Heart

By David Henreckson

 

The use of careful argumentation, the selection of illustrative literary passages, the passionate rhetorical appeal at the conclusion—all these skills belong to the old-fashioned apologist and the peripatetic philosopher.

In my old hometown, there is a Catholic seminary with colonnaded bridges, hundreds of wooded acres, and a pristine lake for which it is named. It feels secluded and buffered from modern reality. You forget about the Metra line, the sub-development of McMansions, and the 1960s-era ice cream stand that lie just across a busy suburban street.

For many years when I went home, I ran the paths around the lake as my favorite form of self-therapy. If I got out early enough, it was unlikely I would see another human being. It was just me and the Colonial-revival buildings and nature’s white noise murmuring from cicadas in the trees and bullfrogs at the water’s edge.

A well-known modern architect quoted the great Renaissance man, Leon Battista Alberti, to describe the seminary’s campus: it possesses “reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body, so that nothing may be added, taken away, or altered, but for the worse.” I came to understand this better on a seminary run some years ago while emerging from what I only retrospectively knew as depression stemming from disorienting loss. At the time, I had no intellectual concept to describe my state. Just unfeeling, buzzing like mental static on the periphery of daily life.

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In James K. A. Smith’s elegant essay, perhaps his most personal and certainly my favorite, he describes a Pauline deconversion from “philosophy” as a way of life. I put the term in scare quotes to signal that I suspect he and I simply want to load that concept with different content. This may only be the semblance of disagreement, more about definition than substance. But it is still, I believe, worth teasing out.

By Pauline deconversion I mean to say that Smith names a revelatory loss of a kind of zealotry, much like Saul on the road to Damascus. He also describes a loss of faith in something that once provided intellectual stability. Philosophical training had given him “the ardor of the apologist . . . with the confidence of having the Truth on one’s side.” I winced with recognition at this line, as I think most former graduate students would, remembering what awful feelings result from mingling intellectual zeal with imposter syndrome as you try to perform your way to a seemingly unattainable university job.

While Smith says that he hasn’t given up on truth, per se, he finds it increasingly unlikely that “we’ll think our way out of the morass and malaise in which we find ourselves. Analysis won’t save us.” Instead, he argues, we need a vision of the beautiful. An imagination copious with empathy for our neighbor—love, in other words—will save us.

The use of careful argumentation, the selection of illustrative literary passages, the passionate rhetorical appeal at the conclusion—all these skills belong to the old-fashioned apologist and the peripatetic philosopher. And in his essay, I still recognize Smith as an exemplar of both vocations. He’s simply doing philosophy without the scare quotes.

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One the most important concepts for traditional moral philosophy was phronesis: the practical application of wisdom to complex circumstances in a virtuous manner. To be practically wise, for the ancients and medievals, was not a matter of IQ, but the perfect melding of intellect, know-how, and moral goodness.

I rarely claim this kind of wisdom for myself—unless I’m exerting all my powers of parental persuasion on family movie night when my daughter has proposed watching Frozen 2 for the eighty-ninth time. But I do think that something like phronesis was at work on the seminary run some time ago.

In that moment at the seminary, silent and seemingly abandoned, I didn’t know what I loved. My motivations were opaque to me. Aristotle and Aquinas say that human beings naturally desire that which seems good, but my mental appetite had grown dull. I remember the moment, mid-run, when I stopped on a bridge and just started to regulate my breathing. Friends and therapists had tried giving me words and concepts to describe what was going on, and what practical tools might help. Prior to this moment on the bridge, my will had been too weak, and the words didn’t help.

But something was different now. The words and concepts previously given to me returned to mind like anamnesis, catalyzed at the right time and place. Strange as it may sound, I felt liberated by the ability to delineate feelings of uncertainty and loss. “This is what it means to be ‘listless,’ or ‘bereft,’ or ‘hopeful’ once again.” Thinking didn’t save me, but it did help me to name—with stuttering success—what had broken and what practical measures might start the mending. This was a moment, I believe, in which the intellect worked in concert with my will and emotions—and, very importantly, the contemplative surroundings. 

It may sound like I’m trying to smuggle classical conceptions of rationality into contemporary notions of emotional awareness: Brené Brown cloaked under Aristotelian virtue ethics or Augustinian moral psychology. Perhaps I am doing some smuggling. But I do think that wisdom applied to action trains our unformed and unruly desires. It invites us to confess that our true loves are often mislabeled by our own hearts, that self-deception is an addictive substance, and that principles for action gained from experience, self-knowledge, and an abundance of wise friends is an invaluable good.

So, I confess to some anxiety about pinning all our hopes for persuasion and moral transformation solely on appeals to beauty and narrative empathy—as much as I value those things. I worry, for instance, about the very effective sophistry of the political fringe and the narrative power of the social media hivemind. I also worry about the heart’s ability to weave stories that cater to our misbegotten appetites and addictions.

This is where I believe the “disagreement,” also in scare quotes, really dissipates between Jamie and me. After all, few contemporary thinkers have written so clearly and evocatively on the waywardness of the heart as Jamie has. My first-year students get Augustine and Aristotle as well as they do because of his writing. For that matter, I try to be the moral philosopher I am in no small part because of Jamie’s example.

It would be wrongheaded to set Smith against Smith. I simply want to pay attention to the coordinated movements of heart and intellect, of desire and knowledge. Like my moment on the bridge, it’s sometimes hard to tell where the vision of the beautiful ends and intellectual pursuit of wisdom begins.

Philosophy as a way of life, in my experience, is often about finding traces of truth, beauty, and goodness amid the ruins. It compels us to seek that “reasoned harmony of all the parts,” especially the broken parts of human existence. It provides contemplative space amid the buzzing mental static of modern life. And it’s the kind of intellectual therapy that breaks you down in order to piece things back together—a consolation of the heart’s desires.

David Henreckson is Director of the Institute for Leadership and Service at Valparaiso University. He has a Ph.D in Religion from Princeton University, and his first book is The Immortal Commonwealth: Covenant, Community, and Political Resistance in Early Reformed Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

 

Falling in Love Again

By M. M. Townsend

 

The philosophy I remember reading is the philosophy of Socrates, who never wrote a book, who had no dreams of punditry, who got very passionate in the equivalent of small cafés but never tried to sell it on the larger circuit, and who died without being sure he was on the right track at all.

I remember when I fell in love with Plato. It was in December, just a few days before I would be flying back to Louisiana from Maryland after my first semester of college. I remember walking around the hills of my small brick college town and thinking, Plato! This thought lasted as long as I could walk, and I walked for a long time.

This was a resolution, for me, of a severe dilemma. At my college, all the freshman began reading the Republic together in October. It takes three weeks of two classes per week to make one’s way through the book. I was finding it pleasantly strange, until I slammed into the discussion of poetry in its tenth and final book. I couldn’t understand, first of all, why Socrates would ban poetry from the beautiful city. I was extremely fond of poetry and found this personally insulting.

But the real problem was worse. First he says poetry, music, literature, scripture must be edited, exorcised via non-aesthetic principles; but then later on, he revises this to say that all things resembling poetry itself, imitation as such, as endless mirror reflections of something better than itself, have to be exiled altogether from our common lives—gone forever. But was this the worst? Not at all. As my seminar tutor pointed out, this argument comes down to us as written in the very sort of poetic style that Socrates condemns: a condemnation of poetry straight from the mouth of a poet’s beloved. What can you do with a contradiction like that? I rejoiced to think I simply did not know.

But I was shaken: if imitation is bad, but you only learn about its problems from imitation itself, what exactly do you do next? Personally, I gave up being an actress, to start (thank goodness I couldn’t make myself give up music and singing). Walking around town some more, I kept wondering: How can you say that Plato is for, or against, poetry? Neither side made sense. If poetry is bad, don’t write it. If poetry is good, why write to cancel yourself? Plato sets but a poor example for the rest of us. You can’t listen to him because he has no advice.

So why was I suddenly locked into a one-sided love affair with this intractable author? In high school, I had read Plato’s Apology as an act of rebellion, unassigned, stealing back a few hours otherwise owing to documented schoolwork. At the time, in my small Catholic high school where I was regularly on the wrong side of the law for wearing the wrong earrings, with skirts alternatively too long and too short, making too many jokes in official documents, I was happily captivated by the image Socrates presents of himself in his speech. He was, to me, the noble loner, the sole defender of truth hounded by unserious, ignorant men. Even the narrator of Dostoyevsky’s Notes from the Underground could not satisfy my desire for rebellion more. What did Plato have in him after all, his underworlds, his Cave, his Atlantis? Plato might seem to disavow poetry in favor of philosophy, but surely what he gives you back is both at once, with all the fervor of a story you can’t forget. I resolved to love Plato, even if he did not love me back.

But time at college was spinning me away from the Greeks, and into strange corridors. I had begun my interest in the Greek philosophers as an atheist, eager to escape the distortion that Christianity had practiced on the natural world. But by the time I’d made it through Greece, Rome, medieval Europe, and then on to Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill, I realized I was lonely again. The world felt empty; Locke was empty, and so was that jerk Francis Bacon. I started to realize that I hadn’t been looking to the Greeks for a godless world, but for a redirection back to a world that was full not of doctrines but of gods, the temple dedicated to the one last unknown god.

But I was still not sure my love was worth other people’s time. I knew too many people who thought that being a woman was disqualifying for studying philosophy, and worse, they often seemed rather sharper than others and otherwise; I still can love sharpness for its own sake. It wasn’t until I read Hegel that I felt the spirit move again. Here too was poetry and philosophy in one, and I rejoiced to see that it made no sense to almost anyone else. If you can understand Hegel, surely you are not disqualified from the love of philosophy?

Hegel had no lasting advice, either, but he was captivating. He counsels that art strives for the same heights as philosophy; and also that religion and philosophy are the same, united in a worship of the divine, an argument that has satisfied almost no one in the history of the world. Strange image, and its prisoners strange, yet I fell for it hard. In high school, the world of religion had revolved around the catechism, a book designed to be a book of answers, which I was taught to defend—though it hardly needed my help, considering the whole court of canon law there to back it up. Hegel, in his singular Lutheranism, offered a way past law to the spirit, past the petty brokenness of sedimented language and the strength of sin that is the law. Eventually I stopped wanting to be forgiven for things it took a court of law to weigh in on; eventually I stopped wanting to be forgiven things I couldn’t understand at the tip of my own tongue.

After Locke and Bacon, I started going back to church, but this time to a Protestant church, and at night, on a weekday, to a service run by women—but not by those who had to apologize, as I’d seen a nun do in Lafayette, Louisiana, one Sunday, for having the temerity to preach a sermon on her own authority. Later, I found an Episcopal church that was not dedicated to the pursuit of wealth but to the gospel. I went to church and kept going because unlike people at school, Christians had to love you, even and especially if they didn’t want to. Loving without hope, I could live with that. Hear the comfortable words of our Savior: Jesus Christ came to this world to save sinners; and who else was going to do it?

James K. A. Smith talks about the love of philosophy and the love of wonder going to grad school to die. I think I almost died. I remember that. Why are America’s philosophers full of tears? I remember hearing stories of Plato as the cold rationalist, but I could not understand it. In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates speaks of a perfect love, one that reaches up through the imperfection of individual humans to the love of the beautiful itself. It sounds like a lovely sort of speech, and it is, up until you realize that Socrates has left something out. It takes someone who loves him, loves Socrates, in all the perfection and misery of unrequited love, to join the conversation, to let us see what’s missing. Alcibiades bursts into the room to mess the whole tale up, to hymn and harp the suffering and the glory of loving someone who doesn’t love you back. Socrates refuses him, yet Alcibiades remains in love. Loving is worth being unrequited. The good news is, loving God feels like unrequited love, but it is not.

I agree with Smith that philosophy, conceived as rationalism, where rationalism needs no rhetoric or poetry, but simply hits you on the head with a ruler until you pretend to agree, is no sort of love at all. But this is not philosophy. The philosophy I remember reading is the philosophy of Socrates, who never wrote a book, who had no dreams of punditry, who got very passionate in the equivalent of small cafés but never tried to sell it on the larger circuit, and who died without being sure he was on the right track at all. Western philosophizing loves to see itself as footnotes to Plato’s Socrates, without remembering that you can’t make a footnote to someone who never wrote a book. It’s no surprise that the philosophy that made it to the western part of Europe and then Britain and then America simply has not followed Socrates’ advice. And it continues to mistake the attempt to assert wisdom on someone else’s head for the love of the thing it necessarily has to do without, that is, wisdom.

Let us by all means see what philosophy as narrow rationalism misses. And let us have poetry back again as the fur lining to our despair, the foretaste of joy. I don’t think we can do without either. They are not the same, as someone like Hegel might blithely claim. But they are not completely different, as Plato’s poetic paradox implies. Socrates, Socrates, Socrates! It’s impossible to try to love him without loving something else. I urge us to try first the one, and then the other.

Mary Townsend is a professor of philosophy at St. John’s University, Queens, New York. She has written on culture and philosophy for The Atlantic, The Hedgehog Review, and Plough Quarterly, as well as a book on Plato’s Republic.

 

When Our Best Words Fail

By Justin Ariel Bailey

 

The issue is not a choice between argument or art, but the expectations of self-sufficiency and possession that attend our understanding of what it means to be human, to believe, and to bear witness.

I am about to turn 40. I recently revisited some writing from when I was about to turn 30 and was struck by the optimism and the eagerness of my younger self. At the time, I was happily serving in an immigrant church, living in the parsonage with my wife, and raising two tiny humans.

What I did not see coming was a career in academia. I was raised in a tradition that taught me to be suspicious of anyone who had an advanced education—especially in theology. Seminary was a cemetery, the place where people went to lose their faith. When I got over my initial, ingrained suspicion and arrived at seminary myself, I was quite critical of fellow students who entered wanting to become pastors, and left wanting to become professors. They were abandoning the grittiness of local church ministry, I surmised, for an easier life in the ivory tower of ideas.

It turns out I was wrong, even if my heart was in the right place in its loyalty to my local congregation. My perspective was puny in its pragmatism. I thought that seminary was mostly about accessing and accumulating the best answers for the questions that the people in my church were asking. Academics were suspect because they were hoarding the answers, Scrooge-like, rather than sharing their treasure with the Church.

But the longer I served in ministry, the more I found that something other than eloquent answers was needed. One day, a student told me that listening to me preach was like being placed under a spell. That sounded encouraging, until he continued: “When I walk out of church, the spell is broken.” So I went back to seminary in search of stronger spells.

I wanted better answers, but what I got was better questions, and a more holistic understanding of the human person. I owe much to James K. A. Smith in this regard. Smith’s writing has been a faithful guide for me for the last decade. He taught me not to fear post-modernism. I followed him into the strange new world of Radical Orthodoxy. Most importantly, his book Desiring the Kingdom gave me language for the quest I was on in my ministry to emerging adults.

In his bracingly personal essay, Smith tells the story of a shift in his vocational sensibility: from magisterial apologist to ministerial artist, from “conqueror of the intellect” to cultivator of the imagination, from Comment magazine to Image journal. The essay is part personal testimony, and part iconoclastic exposé. As he tells the story, Smith unmasks of the idols of the academy: self-sufficiency, possession, control, and mastery. (Willie James Jennings’s book After Whiteness addresses these characteristics in greater detail.)

Smith writes: “Nothing beats the love of wisdom out of you like a graduate program in philosophy…. Philosophy begins in wonder… but a doctorate in philosophy is where wonder goes to die.” A friend mentioned to me that a similar sentiment obtains for programs in theology —just replace “love of wisdom” with “love of God.” But this was not my experience.

How did my faith weather the idols of the academy? The jury is still out. But part of the answer is that my world started out so small, and that every new stage of my educational journey opened up stunning new vistas. Part of the answer is that a local church kept me connected to reality. And part of the answer is that I studied writers like George MacDonald and Marilynne Robinson, who nourished my imagination.

Nevertheless, what I have found to be most dangerous for my faith is not academic rigor, critical perspectives, or even impostor syndrome. It is instead the intoxicating feeling of doing things with words, the feeling that my words have the power to shift someone else’s consciousness, the weaving of the spell itself. My work has always involved words: first as a pastor, then as a professor, and finally as a writer. I have always loved words, treasuring a secret belief that the right words could fix any problem. If prose doesn’t work, maybe poetry will do. And if addressing the intellect is not enough, maybe we can aim at the imagination. But idols of mastery and control afflict artists, too. The imagination, it turns out, is no safe harbor from self-importance.

In my best moments, writing feels like praying. But there is a line from C.S. Lewis’s The Great Divorce that haunts me: “Every poet and musician and artist, but for Grace, is drawn away from the love of the thing he tells, to the love of the telling till, down in Deep Hell, they cannot be interested in God at all but only in what they say about Him.”

The issue is not a choice between argument or art, but the expectations of self-sufficiency and possession that attend our understanding of what it means to be human, to believe, and to bear witness. If poetic knowing holds any promise over pragmatic knowing, it is because of the way that it seeks to set us free from the need to be in control.

By itself, even poetry cannot set us free. It is not enough for us to be told, even in the most elevated language. We have to be shown. As Smith’s story shows, we have to come face to face with our limitations in knowing and in loving. This can only occur in concrete relationships in local communities, with others who share our creaturely limitations, our joys, our hopes, our pains. Love’s knowledge is the sort found in the places where our best words fail.

It is fitting to close with Smith’s recollection of the erudite but obtuse sermons he preached when he was in his twenties: “Here were people quietly burying their elders, terrified for children bent of destroying themselves, facing death and loneliness and loss, never given permission to doubt, carrying any number of secret burdens and sins they longed to confess; and here’s a 22-year-old kid who’s read a lot of books…” That line is gold—worth printing out and placing above the desk where I write. I am thankful that young preachers, professors, and parents can grow up, as Smith did—and as I did. And I am thankful that I have found the world to be God’s school to teach us how to love.

Justin Ariel Bailey is assistant professor of theology at Dordt University. He is the author of Reimagining Apologetics (IVP Academic, 2020). He is an ordained minister in the Christian Reformed Church, and he has served as a pastor in Filipino-American, Korean-American, and Caucasian-American settings.